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Abstract – Emergencies of catastrophic scale, whether they are the result of a natural disaster, a major industrial 
accident, or from malicious acts of terrorism, may overwhelm a single governmental agency’s ability to respond, 
requiring cooperation and collaboration across many agencies.  Events such as our nation experienced on 9/11, and 
more recently from Hurricanes Rita and Katrina, or the disastrous Tsunami south-east Asia experienced, are 
examples of such events. U.S. Federal Agencies are tasked under the National Response Plan to develop, coordinate, 
and disseminate timely and accurate consequence assessment information to appropriate decision makers at all 
levels of government for use in responding to an emergency.  Many Federal agencies have developed effective 
hazardous material atmospheric transport and dispersion models to support their respective statutory missions.  
Utilizing an ensemble approach to consequence assessments, a system could be developed to analyze, compare, and 
integrate “approved” Federal model plume projections and other relevant data to support timely decision-making at 
all levels of government.  This paper addresses the need for establishing an ensemble based Federal consequence 
assessment system supported by regional emergency response centers to provide a “defense in depth” and utilize the 
advantage of regional resources and knowledge to more effectively assist state and local decision-makers.  By using 
existing Federal atmospheric transport and dispersion expertise and technology/infrastructure capabilities with 
regional organizational structures, support of Federal consequence assessment functions at the national level could 
be accomplished in a cost effective manner. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In response to 9/11, President George W. Bush issued 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5 on 
February 28, 2003 which directed the U. S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), in coordination with other 
Federal Agencies, to develop a new “all hazards” 
National Response Plan (NRP).  The NRP was issued in 
December 2004[1]. Federal Agencies were tasked to 
develop and maintain systems/capabilities to respond to 
potential natural or man-made hazards, including 
capabilities for responding to the NRP design basis threat 
of simultaneous international/domestic terrorist threats or 
acts involving the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD). 
The NRP utilizes the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) to provide a common basis for planning, 
response, communications, and coordination between 
Federal, State, local, and Tribal Governmental 
authorities/organizations, consistent with the scope of an 
emergency event.  In accordance with NRP and NIMS, 
the Federal Government has initiated an approach of 
establishing national, regional, state, and local capabilities 
(i.e., planning, preparedness, and response) for 
responding to “Incidents of National Significance.”  
Under the NRP/NIMS, the incident management system 
can expand or contract consistent with the magnitude of 
the emergency and also be effective for responding to 
limited scope events at the local and/or state level.  
The tasks of various Federal Agencies, under the 
NRP, include the development, coordination, and 
dissemination of timely and accurate consequence 
assessment information associated with the 
potential/actual release of radiological/non-radiological 
hazardous materials to appropriate Federal, State, local, 
and Tribal Governmental authorities/decision makers for 
use in responding to an emergency.  Use of additional 
Federal Agency resources to support the regionalization 
of Federal consequence assessment functions would 
constitute an expansion of Federal Agency mission 
responsibilities under the NRP and require an obligation 
of additional funding.  
II. ENSEMBLE METHODOLOGIES AND 
FEDERAL CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT 
Federal Agencies, such as those identified below; 
have developed many effective hazardous material 
  
atmospheric transport and dispersion models, expertise, 
and related infrastructure and technological assets, at 
varying levels of capability, to support their respective 
statutory responsibilities and missions.  
§ Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA) 
§ Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
§ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) 
§ Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)  
§ Nuclear Regulatory Administration (NRC)  
· National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA)  
In order to make effective use of the many existing 
Federal atmospheric transport and dispersion models, a 
system is needed to analyze, compare, and integrate 
plume projections and other relevant data. Such a system 
would facilitate providing accurate, timely, and mutually 
supporting Federal consequence assessment information 
to assist governmental authorities, in implementing 
protective action and other essential decisions to protect 
the public health and safety. 
The European ENSEMBLE program (Fig. 1) has 
demonstrated a methodology that facilitates comparing 
results from over 25 different atmospheric consequence 
assessments from modeling systems from over 20 
different countries, including the U. S., in real-time. 
Differences between the various consequence assessments 
may be due to differences in the basic meteorological 
analyses and forecasts from the respective national 
weather services, or due to basic differences between each 
transport and diffusion model, or they may represent 
different, but equally mathematically valid, solutions to a 
complex physical system described by many nonlinear 
differential equations. In the ENSEMBLE project, 
composites of model plume ensembles have been 
compared with tracer studies from the European Tracer 
Experiment (ETEX). It was found that ensemble plumes 
are more accurate than individual model plumes [2].  
III. BENEFITS OF REGIONAL CONSEQUENCE 
ASSESSMENT CENTERS 
There are clear advantages in having a network of 
complementary Federal assets, equipment/infrastructure 
and experienced personnel, located in different regions 
across the United States (U. S.), rather than a single 
centralized asset/center.  This approach would ensure 
continuous Federal coverage during a disaster and provide 
necessary support as may be available to all levels of 
government.  The recent response to natural disasters our 
nation has faced, Hurricanes Rita and Katrina, 
demonstrate how vulnerable an entire region of the U. S. 
is to an “Incident of National Significance.”  The concept 
of “defense in depth” for “Incidents of National 
Significance” supports a geographically distributed 
system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: A composite or ensemble plume from 16 atmospheric 
numerical models from 13 nations’ modeling centers for a 
fictitious release from a nuclear plant at Glasgow Scotland. The 
pinks and purple contours indicate 70-100% of the models predict 
the location of a surface concentration; the yellows indicate only 
up to 30% of the models predict that threshold surface 
concentration.   
Federal agencies as described above, maintain, at 
varying levels of capability, atmospheric transport and 
dispersion modeling technology/infrastructure and 
experienced personnel that could support the 
establishment of Regional Consequence Assessment 
Centers (Regional Center).  Specific locations would be 
based on the adequacy of existing capabilities and 
geographic location.  Regional centers would utilize lines 
of communications established by other Federal agencies 
with regional homeland security responsibilities to 
facilitate planning and preparedness coordination with 
appropriate Federal, State, local, and Tribal Government 
authorities.  Appropriate Federal agencies would 
coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) in the development policy, plans, and procedures 
to support regional center operations. 
Regional Centers would enhance the effectiveness of 
the Federal consequence assessment function to include 
the following: 
§ Promote more thorough routine planning; 
preparedness; emergency response communications 
and coordination between regional centers and 
responsible Federal, State, local, and Tribal 
Government authorities throughout the designated 
  
region. This would include contingency planning for 
designated “National Special Security Event” 
(NSSE).  
§ Continue the development and improvement of 
mutual cooperation and respect between Federal, 
regional, State, local and Tribal Governmental 
authorities in meeting government’s responsibilities 
for protecting the public health and safety, especially 
through more interpersonal interactions which are 
possible at the regional level; 
§ Provide defense in depth through redundancy to 
respond to “Incidents of National Significance” 
impacting multiple regions of the U. S. ; 
§ Provide an additional resource base and reach-back 
capability for responding to a NRP design basis 
WMD threat that could exceed the capacity of a 
single center; 
§ Ensure the availability, and provide more timely and 
customized, consequence assessment information to 
appropriate regional, State, local, and/or Tribal 
governmental authorities/decision makers; and  
§ Facilitate the development of region specific 
consequence assessment capabilities/applications by 
identifying regional, state, and local data resources 
(e.g., meteorological data collection systems, locally 
maintained geographic information system (GIS) 
data, HAZMAT inventories, etc.) for optimum use in 
regional center consequence assessment systems. 
· Providing ENSEMBLE based consequence 
assessment information through a Regional Center 
would significantly increase the timeliness and 
technical/political credibility of the data. 
Capabilities to support Regional Consequence 
Assessment Center operations would include: 
§ Ability to observe, collect, forecast, and archive 
meteorological conditions/data to support Federal 
consequence assessment functions on a local, 
regional, and national basis; 
§ A 24/7 operations center to: 
o Receive requests for consequence assessment 
support; 
o Notify “On-Call” regional center staff;  
o Support notification and communications with 
national center; and, 
o Provide other assistance as requested. 
§ An established suite of atmospheric transport and 
dispersion consequence assessment models with 
attendant technology, infrastructure, and 
communication capabilities; and,  
· On call experience personnel (24/7) with computer 
stations at residences to ensure timely initial 
response; 
IV.  “NOTIONAL” CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
FEDERAL CONSEQUENCE ASESSMENT 
RESPONSE 
A regional consequence assessment response to 
limited scope events, as well as an initial response to 
events designated as “Incidents of National Significance”, 
would essentially be the same.  A “Notional” Concept of 
Operations for a Regional Consequence Assessment 
Center (Regional Center) emergency response is 
presented in Figure 2 and described below.  
Local authorities would request consequence 
assessment support through an authorized State/Tribal 
organization (e.g., Emergency Management Agency).  
The request would be forward with available event data 
(e.g., event location, description, release information, 
meteorological data, etc.) to the appropriate Regional 
Center.  The On-call staff would acknowledge the request, 
initiate a response utilizing the Regional Center’s 
“approved” (locally developed) primary model, and notify 
the National Consequence Assessment Center (National 
Center).  The National Center would initiate notification 
of other Regional Centers, consistent with the 
scope/severity of the event, to support consequence 
assessments utilizing their respective “approved” primary 
models. 
Each Regional Center’s model output would be 
entered into an Ensemble program, with which the 
Regional Center would develop a composite analysis for 
communication and interpretation to the requesting 
State/Tribal/local decisions makers.  Results would be 
updated as incident data changes, or as additional 
Regional Center models come on line, and/or, specialized 
analysis/modeling is requested.   
The responsible Regional Center would continue to 
provide consequence assessment data and maintain direct 
communications through technical consultations with 
State/Local/Tribal decision makers. When the National 
Center comes on line, with support of other Regional 
Centers as appropriate, it will assume the responsibility 
for the coordination of Federal assets, and the 
dissemination of timely and accurate Federal consequence 
assessment information.  Depending on the anticipated 
duration of the emergency and/or upon request of proper 
governmental authority, the responsible Regional Center 
would deploy a field liaison team(s) to facilitate 
communications, coordination, and interpretation of 
consequence assessment data with Federal regional and 
State/Local/Tribal governmental authorities, as 
appropriate. 
 
  
Should the emergency event be designated as an 
“Incident of National Significance,” concurrent with 
activities described above, key Federal 
Departments/Agencies, would begin to forward deploy 
and staff appropriate Federal regional 
coordination/response facilities consistent with severity of 
the event.  Among the missions of these Federal regional 
facilities would be to establish priorities, and coordinate 
Federal consequence assessment assistance to the affected 
jurisdiction(s).  Regional Center Field Liaison Teams 
would be integrated into the organization structure of the 
Federal, as appropriate.  Increased requirements for the 
deployment of liaison teams to affected jurisdiction(s) 
would also be anticipated.  Regional Center personnel 
would be supplemented by qualified personnel from other 
Regional/National Centers to support staffing of 
necessary liaison teams as necessary.  
 
Figure 2:  “Notional” Concept of Operations for a Regional 
Consequence Assessment Center emergency response is presented 
in and described below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V.  CASE STUDY 
The potential value of implementing a regional 
consequence assessment center concept described above 
can be presented by a Case Study describing pre-2005 
coordination and collaboration between the DOE 
Savannah River Site (SRS) and the Savannah River 
National Laboratory (SRNL), located in Aiken, South 
Carolina; and South Carolina/Georgia state, local, and 
private organizations to address areas for mutual 
cooperation and support in the event of an emergency.  
These efforts were proven essential and contributed to 
SRS/SRNL’s (24/7 Operations Center, Fire Department, 
and Atmospheric Technology Group) ability to provide 
timely and effective support to local governmental 
authorities in response to a January 6, 2005, train 
derailment and release of approximately 90 tons of liquid 
chlorine in Graniteville, SC.  This event resulted in 9 
deaths and evacuation of more than 5,000 citizens for 
approximately 14 days (Fig. 3). 
 
 
  
Relationships that were developed through this 
ongoing collaboration enabled effective communication 
with local authorities/decision makers and confidence in 
the consequence assessments they were given during the 
course of the response.  In addition to providing model 
data that confirmed the adequacy of protective measures 
during the early response phase, ongoing discussions 
fostered a prompt evaluation of alternatives for the 
recovery of an additional chlorine tanker at the scene that 
had been damaged.  Consequence modeling results 
showed that a rupture of this damaged tanker would have 
posed a significant hazard to populations well beyond the 
existing evacuation zone.  As a result, local incident 
commanders wisely deferred disturbing the scene and 
implemented a plan to passively siphon the chlorine 
inventory from the tanker. Providing standard 
atmospheric plume plots from a remote location, without 
close interactive communications and guidance is 
ineffective. Regional centers would be better equipped to 
work closely with local and state responders and decision 
makers, as was shown in this example. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
Federal agency implementation of the regional center 
concept as described above could provide a defense in 
depth redundancy of “state of the art” consequence 
assessment capabilities.  These capabilities based on an 
ensemble of “approved” Federal Agency atmospheric 
transport and dispersion models and geographically 
distributed in the U.S., would provide for the 
communication of timely, accurate, and coordinated 
Federal consequence assessment information to 
appropriate Federal, State, local, and Tribal Government 
authorities/decision-makers to protect the public health 
and safety.  The regional concept could also provide 
additional resources for responding to a NRP design basis 
WMD threat.  By building on the existing expertise, 
capabilities, and infrastructure of Federal agencies, 
development of Federal consequence assessment 
resources could be accomplished in a more cost effective 
manner. 
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Fig. 3: Aerial photograph of the Graniteville train accident on 
January 6, 2005. Three chlorine cars were derailed: one was 
ruptured, spilling 90 tons of chlorine, tone other was damaged, but 
did not release any chlorine. Photograph courtesy of the Augusta 
Chronicle Newspaper 
 
